COLLEGE OF EUROPE
NATOLIN CAMPUS
EUROPEAN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES
Academic Year: 2023-2024
Keywords: Caucasus, Central Asia, Conflict, Peace
Wordcount: 2260
Outline
I. General background
II. Nature of military conflict
III. Soviet Union background
IV. Society
V. Limitations
VI. Conclusion
VII. Bibliography
Introduction
The topic of the following essay is to assess what explains the lack of interstate violence between central asian countries in view of the strife that has characterized the caucasus mass protests.
Hypothesis
My hypothesis is that lack of interstate violence between Central Asian countries in view of the strife that has characterized the Caucasus mass-protest is characterised by more useful soviet legacy in central Asia than in Caucasus, and by more complicated geopolitical interplay in Caucasus than in central Asia, with civil society in place.
Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, are primarily governed by authoritarian regimes characterized by centralized control, restricted political freedoms, and limitations on civil society. The Caucasus, on the other hand, includes countries such as Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, with a heterogeneous political landscape of democracies, semi-democracies and authoritarian-leaning systems. While authoritarian regimes in Central Asia prioritise stability and centralised control to suppress dissidents and weaken nationalist movements, the Caucasus offers different institutional frameworks that provide opportunities for opposition mobilisation and social activism.
Both regions are at risk of secessionism, which threatens political stability and integrity, but the political diversity in the Caucasus, with open manifestations of discontent, makes this region more prone to open, violent conflict1. However, in addition to societal reasons, there are many other factors, ranging from the nature of past military conflicts, through the past legacy of the Soviet Union, to foreign influences and the geopolitical puzzle of which these regions are a piece.
As opposed to current logic, the armed conflicts are present in Central Asia, and lack of political diversity, doesn’t mean no military clashes in the region. The most recent conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had its origins in a territorial dispute over a water reservoir on the Isfara River. The scale of the conflict, which is unprecedented, revealed a deeper issue of territorial claims and resource allocation in this region. It has also put into perspective general security in the region2.
There is a growing concern about the prospect of unresolved territorial disputes escalating into more intense military confrontations. In particular, there are disputes not only over the water reservoir on the Isfara River, but also over the Uzbek exclave of Sokh3. These disputes often revolve around issues of land ownership, access to resources and control over strategic transport routes. The region is an intersection of many global reaching processes. On the one hand, the resources such as water are becoming increasingly scarce and valuable. On the other hand, China's Belt and Road Initiative is planned for the region4.
On the nature of conflict in the region, there are deep-seated historical animosities underlying the conflicts in Central Asia; the disputes are not just about current issues but are rooted in long-standing tensions. There is a danger of increased military action, such as the use of advanced weaponry and larger troop mobilisations, which could further escalate the conflicts, to the unmanageable scale. The hostilities that would continue could destabilise the entire region, undermining trust and cooperation between neighbouring countries5.
Both China and Russia have an interest in the stability of the Central Asian region, despite their military forces being stationed at a considerable distance from it. While the region may not be directly adjacent to their borders and may have less developed transportation infrastructure compared to other areas within their respective countries, it holds strategic significance due to its geopolitical position and access to key resources. Therefore, both nations closely monitor developments in Central Asia and seek to influence regional dynamics to safeguard their broader geopolitical interests6.
The conflicts in Caucasus, has different origins than in Central Asia, taking the example of conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia that began after the Soviet Union collapse. Georgia, after gaining independence, saw Abkhazia as part of its territory, but the Abkhaz people felt their language, culture, and identity were threatened and wanted more autonomy. This led to a full-scale war that lasted over a year, resulting in many casualties and hundreds of thousands of people being forced to leave their homes. Abkhazia declared independence in 1999, though it wasn't recognized by many countries. In 2008, there was another war involving Georgia and Russia, which affected the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict too. Russia recognized Abkhazia as an independent state and stationed military bases there. Some people in Georgia see this as Russia occupying their land, while others feel it's necessary for Abkhazia's security7.
However, the conflicts differ significantly in several key aspects; the Central Asian conflict, exemplified by the dispute between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan over a water reservoir, primarily revolves around resource allocation and territorial claims. Conversely, the Caucasus conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia stems primarely from deeper historical, cultural, and ethnic animosities. Moreover, governance structures vary markedly between the two regions. Central Asian states involved in the conflict typically exhibit authoritarian regimes, while the Caucasus region encompasses a spectrum of political systems, who vocalise their geopolitical aspirations with Georgia's NATO aspirations and engagement with Western powers influencing the Caucasus dynamics. In contrast, Russia's prominent role in Central Asia shapes the conflict dynamics to a greater extent, not leaving much space for action of western counterparts8.
In contrast to Central Asia, where there were more distinct Socialist Soviet Republics, in the Caucasus there were autonomous regions that acknowledged internal ethnic and cultural diversities across the region; this was not the case in Central Asia. Moreover, prior to the Soviet era, the Caucasus region experienced a sovereignty in a form of democratic republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan, declared during the Paris peace conference in 1920, this again, was not the case for any of the Central Asia countries.
Another example of the Soviet legacy is the management of water resources, including those from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, as well as significant oil and gas reserves. The historical agreements and cooperative frameworks established during the Soviet era have contributed to the effective management and distribution of these resources among the countries of Central Asia. In contrast, the Caucasus region, faces more intense competition for resources and soviet management plans are not of high relevance anymore9.
To understand better how the societal unrest was delt with in central Asia, I will use an example from Tajikistan, where following the civil war of 1992-1997, President Rakhmon consolidated power by extending his presidential term and cracking down on political opponents.
After a series of guerrilla attacks in the Rasht Valley in 2008-2009, Rakhmon prioritised police reform to improve control over remote regions. The insurgents involved in the attacks were reportedly former members of the United Tajik Opposition, the party that fought against government troops during the civil war. Political leaders blamed the outbreaks of violence on the police's inability to gather intelligence about rural populations' loyalties and the willingness of rural communities to protect opposition forces. The situation escalated further in 2009-2011 when Rakhmon ordered military operations against the United Tajik Opposition, under the guise of antinarcotics sweeps. This culminated in a transformative moment of violence in the summer of 2009 when government troops killed dozens of militants in a bloody battle. Unlike other incidents of violence, this suppression in the Rasht Valley occurred over months and years. Tajikistan's case is noteworthy for its unique approach to police reform. President Rakhmon recognised the importance of securing the country's periphery, particularly the Rasht Valley, which was an opposition stronghold during the civil war and continued to harbour insurgents. Expanding police forces' reach symbolised Rakhmon's control over the entire territory of Tajikistan, enabling him to suppress the last elements of his opposition10.
For comparison, the Rose Revolution, a formative event in Georgia's modern history, unfolded in November 2003, and signalled a profound shift towards democratic governance. Preceded by a period of increasing discontent with the ruling regime under President Eduard Shevardnadze, the revolution started from widespread allegations of electoral fraud and corruption. While the catalyst was the parliamentary elections of November 2, 2003, the revolution's origins can be traced to the gradual erosion of the Citizens' Union of Georgia's political dominance and the emergence of new political forces. Key to the revolution's success was the convergence of several factors, including the active involvement of civil society organizations, diminishing foreign support for the Shevardnadze government, and the dynamic leadership of opposition figure Mikhail Saakashvili. Civil society organizations, particularly NGOs advocating for human rights and democratic reforms, played a pivotal role in mobilizing public sentiment against the regime's authoritarian practices.
From this comparison, it is visible that in Central Asia, the efforts were mostly put on the fight against the active regime, whereas in Georgia, the active part was the society, and it was a government that held a defensive position.
The research question is complex and requires a multi-faceted approach to answer adequately. Unfortunately, due to the constraints of this paper, I was unable to explore it comprehensively. One significant obstacle I encountered when seeking sources on Central Asia was my lack of proficiency in Russian and inability to read Cyrillic script, while translations might be useful, sometimes the meaning is flawed. While there were considerably more resources available on the Caucasus, I faced similar challenges as I do not speak Armenian, Georgian, or Azerbaijani. Consequently, I was unable to delve into the nuances of the social situation in the region, which is essential for a thorough understanding and answering of the research question. Therefore, further research, particularly by authors fluent in the languages, is necessary to explore the intricacies of the topic in depth.
This comparison shows that in Central Asia efforts were mainly directed at fighting the active regime, while in Georgia the active part was society and the government was in a defensive position. Geographically speaking, the Soviet legacy left the countries of Central Asia with a more efficient infrastructure for managing their natural resources than was the case in the Caucasus. The conflicts in the Caucasus are characterised by the deep divisions that result from ethnic differences, whereas the conflicts in Central Asia are characterised by conflicts over resources and ethnicity in the second place.
That is why I argue that the lack of interstate violence between Central Asian countries in view of the strife that has characterized the Caucasus mass-protest is characterised by more useful soviet legacy in central Asia than in Caucasus, and by more complicated geopolitical interplay in Caucasus than in central Asia, with civil society in place.
Allworth, Edward, ed. Central Asia, 130 Years of Russian Dominance: A Historical Overview. 3rd ed. Durham: Duke University Press, 1994.
International Crisis Group. "Conflict Watchlist 2023: South Caucasus and Central Asia." Accessed February 1, 2023. https://acleddata.com/2023/02/01/regional-overview-europe-central-asia-december-2022/.
Infrastructural Hope: Anticipating ‘Independent Roads’ and Territorial Integrity in Southern Kyrgyzstan Madeleine Reeves ORCID Icon Pages 711-737 | Published online: 19 Jan 2016 Cite this article https://doi.org/10.1080/00141844.2015.1119176
Nature. "China’s Belt and Road Initiative is boosting science — the West must engage, not withdraw." Editorial, October 24, 2023. Nature 622 (2023): 669-670. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-023-03299-6.
Kevlihan, Rob. "Insurgency in Central Asia: A case study of Tajikistan." Central Asian Survey 35, no. 3 (2016): 417-439. Accessed April 25, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2016.1151656.
Kazantsev, A., Medvedeva, S., & Safranchuk, I. (2021). Between Russia and China: Central Asia in Greater Eurasia. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 12(1), 57-71. https://doi.org/10.1177/1879366521998242
Chatterjee, Phelan. "Abkhazia: Russia to build naval base in Georgian separatist region, says local leader." BBC News, October 5, 2023.
Crisis Group. "Abkhazia: The Long Road to Reconciliation." Report, Europe & Central Asia, April 10, 2013.
Ahmad, Moonis. "The Challenge of Water Management in Central Asia: A Case Study of Aral Sea." The Beacon Journal, 2020-21.
Marat, Erica. "Rural Violence and Expansion of Policing in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan." In Rural Violence and Expansion of Policing, 157-174. Published March 2018. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190861490.003.0008.